Abstract-Underwater acoustic networked systems often consist of geographically distributed antenna elements (DAEs) that are connected via cables or high-rate radio links (e.g., bottomanchored nodes or surface buoys). This paper investigates countermeasures against eavesdropping attack in the coordinated multipoint (CoMP) transmission of DAEs to an underwater legitimate user. Exploiting the low sound speed in water and the spatial diversity of DAEs, we propose signal alignment for transmission secrecy, where a transmission strategy will be judiciously designed such that useful signals will collide at the eavesdropper while stay collisionfree at the legitimate user. Specifically, the transmit DAE set, and the transmission schedule and transmission power of each active DAE are jointly optimized with a goal of minimizing the maximal received signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) of useful signals at the eavesdropper, under a lower bound constraint of the received signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the legitimate user. Taking the orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) as the modulation technique, simulation and emulated experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method significantly degrades the eavesdropper's interception capability. We further investigate the secrecy capacity and the secure degrees of freedom (d.o.f.) of the signal alignment method from an information-theoretic perspective, which reveals that without external helpers, secure d.o.f. greater than 1/2 can be achieved.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
OORDINATED multipoint (CoMP) has recently attracted considerable attention in the radio community [1] , [2] , and been taken as one of the core techniques for the LTEAdvanced system, the 5th generation (5G) cellular networks and the recently proposed C-RAN architecture [3] - [5] . Compared to centralized operations, CoMP promises a larger coverage and a higher throughput for the network with nomadic users [1] , [2] , [6] - [8] . The system architecture with interconnected and geographically distributed antenna elements (DAEs) has also been widely used by engineers for underwater acoustic (UWA) Two examples of underwater distributed antenna systems. In (a), the nodes anchored at water bottom are interconnected and also connected to a control center via fibers and cables. In (b), the gateways can communicate with each other and also with a control center via high-rate radio links.
system development. 1 Two examples are shown in Fig. 1 , where one is formed by distributed nodes which are anchored at the water bottom and connected via cables, and the other is formed by gateways which can communicate instantaneously with a control center via high-rate radio links. A large-scale testbed with 96 DAEs distributed over an area of 30 km × 50 km has been deployed in early days by the Atlantic Underwater Test and Evaluation Center (AUTEC) [9] , where the DAEs are separated by more than 4 km. Another example is the Ocean-TUNE testbed [10] which has four distributed stationary nodes with distances among nodes varying from 500 m to 12 km.
Similar to terrestrial radio networks, UWA networks are prone to adversarial attacks, especially in critical missions, such as tactical surveillance, underwater asset protection, and commercial offshore oil and gas exploration. The attacks could be passive, such as eavesdropping and traffic analysis, or active, such as denial-of-service (DoS) attacks, resource consumption, reply attacks, and message modification [11] . Among all these attacks, the eavesdropping attack often precedes other types of attacks, due to the low cost and low probability of detection. In this work, we investigate the physical-layer security for underwater acoustic CoMP transmissions in the presence of eavesdropping attacks. Despite considerable progress on UWA communications and networking in the last decade [12] - [15] , research on UWA communication and network security has been very limited.
A. Physical-Layer Security in Terrestrial Radio Networks
Due to the nature of broadcast transmission, wireless communication is vulnerable to security attacks. Besides classical security mechanisms such as cryptography, it has recently been shown that communication security can be largely enhanced by exploiting the physical-layer randomness [16] - [18] . Typical physical-layer transmission secrecy mechanisms include: (1) secrecy beamforming or precoding with a multi-antenna source and a single-antenna or multi-antenna destination [19] - [21] ; (2) artificial noise-assisted friendly jamming where the jamming signal can be transmitted by helpers or embedded in the transmitted signal from the source node [17] ; (3) full-duplex transceiving where the destination can simultaneously receive the desired signal from the source and transmit jamming signal to eavesdroppers [22] , [23] ; and (4) security key generation based on physical-layer randomness [24] , [25] .
Particularly about cooperative jamming in the Gaussian wiretap channel, interference alignment is investigated in [26] based on both the legitimate user's and the eavesdropper's channel state information (CSI), where the message from the legitimate transmitter is divided into M submessages, and the cooperative jamming signals from M helpers are specifically designed so that at the legitimate receiver, they are aligned in the same dimension and occupy the smallest signal space, while at the eavesdropper, each jamming signal is aligned with a submessage for transmission secrecy. This approach achieves secure degrees-of-freedom (d.o.f.) of in the latter scenario in the ergodic setting. For an overview on interference alignment for physical-layer security, please refer to [29] , [30] and references therein.
B. Underwater Acoustic Network Security
In contrast to terrestrial radio networks, there has been very limited study on communication and network security in the UWA environment [31] . A literature survey of recent research about secure communication protocols over the network stack is presented in [32] , which calls for more investigation on UWA network security to meet their rapidly growing applications. The DoS attacks, especially jamming attacks on the physical layer and the network layer are investigated in [33] - [35] . Particularly about transmission secrecy, a cooperative jamming method is investigated in [36] for point-to-point transmissions with a friendly jammer. The jamming signal is known a priori only to the legitimate users. Therefore, the legitimate receiver can retrieve the useful information by joint channel estimation and interference suppression, while the eavesdropper cannot perform the above operation due to the lack of knowledge about the jamming signal. When multiple friendly jammers are available, jammer selection and power allocation strategies are investigated to minimize the signal-to-interference-and-noise ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper while maintain a sufficiently large signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) at the legitimate receiver. A gametheory based anti-jamming system is proposed in [37] to secure transmissions from underwater nodes to a surface sink in the presence of a reactive jammer. The static game and the dynamic game between the underwater nodes and the jammer are studied to maximize their individual utilities based on the received SINR of the useful signal and the transmission cost. A closed form of the optimal allocation strategy is derived for the static game with known channel gains, and the reinforcement learning technique is adopted for the dynamic game where the channel gain is not available. The challenges of applying the received signal strength (RSS) for key generation in UWA networks are reviewed in [38] . It points out that, the RSS-based key generation approaches for terrestrial radio networks cannot be directly used in UWA networks since the long transmission delay of probes leads to a low key generation rate and the asymmetric RSS measurements decrease the key agreement probability. To increase the RSS-based key generation rate in UWA networks, it suggests to dividing the communication band into multiple independent subchannels and performing multi-channel key generation (see details in [38] ). To improve the key agreement probability, a smoothing filter is proposed to reduce the RSS random fluctuation. The proposed methods are validated via data collected from sea trials. In [39] , a secret key generation method based on the UWA channel randomness is investigated. A predefined linear block code (e.g., a BCH code) is used for key bits extraction based on the observed channel frequency response at each user. To mitigate the channel observation difference at the two users due to noise or channel asymmetry, the syndrome information at one user is sent to and used at the other user for key reconciliation. The developed approach is validated via field experiments.
C. Our Work
The underwater acoustic environment features large sound propagation latency. For instance, at a nominal sound speed of 1500 m/s, the signal propagation latency for a transmission distance of 3 km is two seconds. In this work, we exploit the low sound speed in water and the spatial diversity of system entities, including the DAEs, the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, and develop signal alignment strategies to secure underwater CoMP transmissions, where the transmission strategy is judiciously designed such that useful signals will collide at the eavesdropper while stay collision-free at the legitimate user, as illustrated in Fig. 2 .
The main contributions of this work are the following. show that the proposed method achieves much higher confidentiality than a benchmark method. When the eavesdropper's location is not available, a simplified version of the proposed method is developed to exploit the spatial diversity of DAEs and the legitimate user for transmission secrecy. Assuming a randomly located eavesdropper, simulation results reveal that the proposed method still achieves a decent transmission secrecy performance. The eavesdropper considered in this work could be a legitimate user who is curious about the message transmitted to other system users, or an adversary who passively intercepts data transmissions under water. The honest-but-curious eavesdropper has been considered in many existing works, e.g., [17] , [40] - [44] , where a priori knowledge of the eavesdropper's location and/or CSI is often assumed. The underwater localization techniques developed in e.g., [45] , can be used for system user positioning. When the eavesdropper is a passive adversary, techniques for passive target localization, such as range and bearing estimation [46] - [48] and target tracking [49] in passive sonar applications, can be applied to estimate the eavesdropper's location.
The proposed signal alignment concept for secure underwater CoMP transmission falls into the general category of interference alignment for physical-layer security. Different from existing research in radio networks that requires accurate CSI and receiver front-end characteristics [26] , [27] , [50] , the low sound speed in water provides grand opportunities to align signal and/or interference in the time domain. Other benefits of exploiting the low sound speed in transmission scheduling, such as UWA network throughput improvement, have been demonstrated in existing works [51] , [52] .
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The system model is presented in Section II. The receiver processing method at the eavesdropper is developed in Section III. The signal alignment method for secure CoMP transmissions is developed in Section IV. + is defined as max{·, 0}. R{·} represents the real part of a complex variable.
II. SYSTEM MODEL FOR COORDINATED MULTIPOINT TRANSMISSIONS
We consider an underwater system with N DAE DAEs that are connected via cables or high-rate radio links. The information message from DAEs to a legitimate user is encoded into multiple blocks using an identical parameter set, with the center frequency, the frequency band, and the time duration of each block denoted by f c , B, and T bl , respectively. Among a set of DAEs for transmission (denoted by T DAE ), each DAE is assigned to transmit an individual block. When the total number of blocks is larger than the number of active DAEs, i.e., M := |T DAE |, a round-based transmission can be performed.
Denote d μ as the distance between the μth DAE and the legitimate user, and denote t μ as the transmission starting time of the μth DAE. The time-of-arrival of the signal from the μth DAE at the legitimate user is
where c is the sound speed in water. Denote N pa,μ as the number of channel paths between the μth DAE and the legitimate user. We assume: (1) the amplitude of the pth path A p,μ (t), is constant within one block, i.e., A p,μ (t) = A p,μ , and (2) the time varying delay of the pth path τ p,μ (t) relative to the delay in the line-ofsight transmission can be approximated as τ p,μ (t) ≈ τ p,μ . The channel impulse response is
Denotes μ (t) as the transmitted signal of the μth DAE. The signal arrived at the legitimate user can be formulated as
Corresponding to the active DAE set T DAE , the overall received signal at the legitimated user can be cast as
whereñ(t) is the ambient noise. According to the pth signal propagation path, denote
l p (t) as the power loss experienced by a signal of frequency f travelling over the distance l p (t) where k is the spreading factor, α(f ) is the absorbtion coefficient, and A 0 is a scaling constant. Based on [53] , the transmission power loss from the μth DAE to the legitimate user can be calculated as
where Q(f ) is the path transfer function can be expressed in terms of a reference path's (p = 0) nominal transfer function as
wherel 0 is the nominal length of a reference path. Denote P tx,μ as the transmission power of the μth DAE, and denote P loss (f, d) as the transmission power loss of an acoustic signal at frequency f for a distance d. Corresponding to the signal from the μth DAE, the received signal power at the legitimate user can be approximated as
A similar system model can be developed for the eavesdropper. Denote d (e) μ as the distance between the μth DAE and the eavesdropper. The time-of-arrival of the signal from the μth DAE at the eavesdropper is
The received signal at the eavesdropper can be formulated as
p,μ } denote the amplitude and delay of the pth path between the μth DAE and the eavesdropper, respectively, andñ (e) (t) is the ambient noise. The received signal power corresponding to the μth DAE's transmission can be similarly obtained as 
III. RECEIVER PROCESSING AT THE EAVESDROPPER
To reduce the eavesdropper's interception capability, one can exploit the low sound speed in water to create signal collision at the eavesdropper while keep the signals well-separated at the legitimate user.
We consider that the eavesdropper has one receive antenna and performs the single-block decoding in the frequency domain by truncating each desired block from the received signal based on its time-of-arrival [54] - [57] , as illustrated in Fig. 3(a) . Taking the block transmitted by the μth DAE as the desired signal, the truncated signal can be expressed as
=ỹ (e)
μ (t) denotes the interference caused by other overlapped blocks.
The Fourier transform of (12) yields
wherẽ
Assume that the ambient noise in the frequency domain is white and follows a zero-mean complex Gaussian distribution, i.e.,Ñ
The SINR at the eavesdropper can be formulated as
Based on the Parseval's Theorem [58] , we have
(17) Moreover, to obtain a closed-form representation of (17), we approximate the transmitted waveform as white Gaussian noise and assume that all the blocks are independently distributed. Hence,
where [·] + := max{·, 0}. The SINR in (16) can be rewritten as
Following the same derivation, the SNR of each received block at the legitimate user can be obtained as
IV. SIGNAL ALIGNMENT FOR TRANSMISSION SECRECY
To minimize the amount of information leaked to the eavesdropper, the active DAE set T DAE , and the transmission starting time and transmission power of each active DAE, can be jointly optimized under a constraint that the received SNR at the legitimate user is sufficiently large for successful decoding. In this work, we take the maximal SINR of the blocks received by the eavesdropper as an indicator of the eavesdropper's interception performance.
A. Signal Alignment With Eavesdropper's Location Information
Sort the time-of-arrivals of signals from all the active DAEs at the legitimate user in an increasing order, i.e., {ξ 1 , ξ 2 , . . . , ξ M }, where the time-of-arrival ξ μ is related to the transmission starting time as ξ μ = t μ + d μ /c. The optimization problem can be cast as min
where Γ th is the lower bound of the required decoding SNR at the legitimate user, (21c) ensures collision-free at the legitimate user, and P th is the maximal transmission power at each DAE.
To make the optimization problem in (21) tractable, we introduce an auxiliary variable
with a new constraint λ (e) μ ≤ , ∀μ ∈ T DAE . The received SNR constraint in (21b) can be translated into a lower bound of the transmission power of each active DAE based on (7) and (20), which combined with (21d) yields P tx,μ,L ≤ P tx,μ ≤ P th .
Define
which satisfies θ μ,ν = θ ν,μ . Define a column vector q of length M , with its μth element
As detailed in Appendix A, the optimization problem in (21) can be reformulated as
where 1 is a column vector of length M with unity elements, q L and q U are similarly defined as q in (24) through replacing P tx,μ by P tx,μ,L and P th , respectively, andG 1 (ξ, ) and G 2 are two matrices of size M × M and (M − 1) × M , respectively,
and
As detailed in Appendix B, through an appropriate modification of (21) based on the receiver processing algorithms at the legitimate user and at the eavesdropper, the proposed signal alignment method can be extended to the scenario with multiple users and multiple eavesdroppers and the scenario when an eavesdropper has multiple geographically distributed antenna elements.
B. Optimization Problem Solver
Although the optimization problem in (25) is derived for quasi-synchronous signal alignment at the eavesdropper (see Fig. 3(a) ), there are scenarios that synchronous signal alignment can be achieved when the blocks can arrive simultaneously at the eavesdropper while stay collision-free at the legitimate user; see an example in Fig. 3(b) . Under those scenarios, the transmission starting time of each active DAE can be immediately determined based on the sound propagation delay to the eavesdropper. For ease of exposition, in this section we will first present a solution to the optimization problem in (25) for synchronous signal alignment, and then proceed to an optimization problem solver for quasi-synchronous signal alignment.
1) Synchronous Signal Alignment: When synchronous signal alignment can be achieved, all the blocks have an identical time-of-arrival at the eavesdropper, i.e., ξ
ν , ∀μ, ν, which can be assumed zero without loss of generality. The transmission starting time of each active DAE, e.g., the μth DAE, can be determined as
μ /c. Furthermore, θ ν,μ = 1, ∀μ, ν, and the matrixG 1 (ξ, ) can be simplified as
The optimization problem for synchronous signal alignment can be cast as min
To solve the optimization problem in (29), we first enumerate all the possible combinations of DAEs. Taking each combination as the active DAE set T DAE , the optimal transmission power of each active DAE can be computed via the bisectional search method and the Simplex method [59] as stated in Algorithm 1. The combination which yields the minimal value of opt provides the final optimal solution. We compared the above optimization method with a grid search method. The two methods yield identical solutions.
2) Quasi-Synchronous Signal Alignment: When the synchronous signal alignment at the eavesdropper and the nonoverlapping constraint at the legitimate user cannot be simultaneously satisfied, quasi-synchronous alignment at the eavesdropper can be performed. Similar to Algorithm 1, to solve the optimization problem in (25), we first enumerate all the possible combinations of DAEs. Taking each combination as the active DAE set T DAE , the optimal transmission starting time and transmission power of each active DAE that yield the minimal value of can be computed via the simulated annealing method [60] and a random search method [61] . The DAE combination which leads to the minimal value of opt provides the final optimal solution. The overall algorithm is described in Algorithm 2. Specifically, in the ith iteration of Algorithm 2, a feasible transmission schedulet is obtained based on the transmission starting time t i−1 in the (i − 1)th iteration. Based ont, the optimal transmission powerp tx and the minimal SINR˜ at the eavesdropper are calculated. The transmission starting timet and transmission powerp tx are recorded if the minimal SINR˜ is smaller than the minimal SINRs obtained in previous iterations. Based on the accepting criteria of the simulated annealing method, the transmission starting timet will be accepted, i.e., t i =t and otherwise t i = t i−1 .
To initialize Algorithm 2, t 0 is taken as the one that allows consecutive arrivals of blocks at the legitimate user with zero intervals, and the arrival sequence of blocks at the legitimate user is identical to the arrival sequence when the blocks arrive simultaneously at the eavesdropper.
Set β = 0.98 and N max = 200. We compared Algorithm 2 with a grid search method in simulations, which showed that the normalized optimal SINR difference is 1.9 × 10 −4 in decimal, averaged over 1000 random system layouts.
Remark 1: In the proposed method, all the transmissions from DAEs are constrained to be useful signals. In fact, some DAEs near the eavesdropper can serve as friendly jammers. The jamming transmission, however, has to be carefully designed to minimize its impact at the legitimate user. A detailed design, including (1) DAE selection for useful signal transmission and for jamming transmission, (2) transmission scheduling and power control, and (3) jamming signal lengths, warrants another piece of work.
C. Signal Alignment Without Eavesdropper's Location
When the eavesdropper's location information is not available, we propose to select a set of active DAEs that satisfy both 
: returnt 1 ort 2 which results in a lower maximal SINR at the eavesdropper the lower bound constraint of the received SNR at the legitimate user and the maximal transmission power constraint. The transmission starting time of each active DAE is determined by allowing blocks arriving consecutively with zero interval at the legitimate user in an arbitrary order. Exploiting the spatial distribution of DAEs and the low sound speed in water, signals from multiple DAEs have a large probability of collision at a randomly located eavesdropper. We will examine the security performance of this scheme in simulations.
V. SECRECY CAPACITY IN AWGN CHANNELS
In this section, we investigate the secrecy capacity of the signal alignment method in AWGN channels. The secrecy capacity per CoMP transmission is defined as
It has been shown that with a Gaussian input, the secrecy capacity equals to the difference between the legitimate link capacity C U and the wiretap link capacity C E [16] , i.e.,
Different from the signal alignment method for the block transmission with an identical length, we will let each active DAE transmit for a maximal time duration as long as there is no collision at the legitimate user, as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The transmission time duration of the μ th DAE is
Without loss of generality, we take the time duration of the signal arriving last at the legitimate user as
which leads to a total reception time duration of the legitimate user
Denote σ 2 w as the ambient noise variance. The legitimate link capacity per CoMP transmission is
Consider that the wiretap link can be regarded as a multi-access (MAC) channel. Its capacity is lower bounded by
where the power of the inter-block-interference at the eavesdropper can be approximated as
rx,ν min(T μ , T ν ).
To derive the upper bound of the wiretap link capacity, we sort the transmission time duration of active DAEs in an increasing order {T o 1 , T o 2 , . . . , T o M }, and for expression convenience, we denote T o 0 = 0. As illustrated in Fig. 4(b) , by truncating the received signal at the eavesdropper into multiple segments based on the number of collided blocks, the upper bound of the wiretap link capacity can be obtained as the sum rate of each truncation,
The lower bound C s,Lo and the upper bound C s,Up of the secrecy capacity per CoMP transmission can be obtained as
Due to the lack of closed-form expression of the secrecy capacity, we will bound the maximal secrecy capacity C opt s by maximizing its lower bound in bits per second, i.e.,
To solve the optimization problem, we first enumerate all the possible combinations of DAEs. Taking each combination as an active DAE set, the total transmission duration T total can be calculated a priori. With the known T total , the objective function of (42) can be rewritten as a difference of two convex functions (DC). With the constraints being affine, the optimization problem (40) is a standard DC programming problem [62] . Hence, the global optimal transmission power of each active DAE that maximizes the lower bound C s,Lo can be obtain by the DC programming algorithm proposed in [63] . Furthermore, it can be shown that in both the high transmission SNR regime and the low transmission SNR regime, C s,Lo can be approximated as weak concave, hence a low-complex solver, such as the interior point method can be used. The combination that has the maximal lower bound of the secrecy capacity leads to the optimal solution.
It is worth noting that, in the very low transmission SNR regime where noise dominates the receiver decoding performance, instead of aligning multiple useful signals at the eavesdropper to create self interference, it can be easily show that the maximal secrecy capacity is achieved by taking the DAE having the largest difference between its distance to the legitimate user and to the eavesdropper for transmission at the maximal power level. In this scenario, the secrecy capacity of Gaussian wiretap channels applies [16] .
To quantify the cost for transmission secrecy, the secure d.o.f., which is defined as the ratio of the secrecy capacity to the capacity without secrecy constraint as the transmission power goes to infinite, is often used. Here, we define the secure d.o.f. as the ratio of the secrecy capacity to the capacity of the channel between the legitimate user and its nearest DAE μ with a transmission power P th , η := lim
The upper and lower bounds of the secure d.o.f. are derived in Appendix C, by substituting the upper and lower bounds of the secrecy capacity in (40) and (41) into (43) . The derivation yields an upper bound of 1, and a lower bound of 1 −
, where
is the ratio of received signal lengths at the eavesdropper and the legitimate user. Since T max ≤
(see (33) , (34) and (35)), the lower bound indicates that a secure d.o.f. greater than 1 2 can be achieved.
VI. SIMULATION RESULTS
We consider a system with N DAE = 4 DAEs, and assume that all the DAEs, the legitimate user and the eavesdropper are uniformly distributed within a disk of radius 4 km. In particular, the distance between any two DAEs is constrained to vary from 100 m to 8 km, and each DAE can cover the entire disk area. The simulation results are averaged over 1000 random system layouts. The transmission loss of the acoustic signal is modeled as
where α(f ) is the frequency-dependent absorption coefficient (see [64] for a simplified formula of α(f )), and β is the pathloss exponent taking a practical value of 1.5. Despite the simple form of the transmission loss in (44) , it suffices to validate the performance of the proposed signal alignment methods. In practical systems, the transmission loss can be estimated based on the received signal strength in field [65] . We assume that each signal block is modulated by the zeropadded (ZP) OFDM technique. Denote K as the total number of subcarriers, and denote T as the time duration of each OFDM symbol. The kth subcarrier frequency is f k := f c + k/T , for k = −K/2, . . . , (K/2) − 1. The signal bandwidth is therefore B = K/T . To avoid the inter-symbol-interference caused by multiple channel paths, a guard interval of length T g is padded at the end of each OFDM symbol. The total time duration of each OFDM block is thus T bl = T + T g . Denote s μ [k] as the data (or pilot) symbol at the kth subcarrier of the μth DAE. The transmitted signal at the μth DAE can be formulated as where g(t) is a rectangular window being one for t ∈ [0, T ] and zero elsewhere.
The ZP-OFDM parameters are listed in Table I . Out of 1024 subcarriers, 96 are null subcarriers with 24 on each edge for band protection and 48 distributed evenly in the middle, 256 are pilot subcarriers for channel estimation, and the remaining 672 are data subcarriers for information delivery. The data symbols are encoded with a rate-1/2 nonbinary LDPC code [66] and modulated with a QPSK constellation, which leads to a data rate
where |S D | denotes the number of data subcarriers.
To simulate underwater acoustic channels, we assume that the channel between each transmit and receive pair consists of 10 discrete paths, where the inter-arrival time of paths follows an exponential distribution with a mean of 1 ms. The path amplitudes are Rayleigh distributed with an average power decreasing exponentially with the delay, where the difference between the beginning and the end of the guard time is 20 dB. We assume that all the paths are time-invariant with zero Doppler rates.
The sparse channel estimation method [67] and the linear minimum mean square error (LMMSE) estimator are adopted for channel estimation and symbol detection, respectively. The block-error-rate (BLER) performance is used as the decoding performance metric. The average transmission SNR to be used in the sequel is defined as
A. BLER Performance
We compare the decoding performance of the eavesdropper and the legitimate user in three configurations. dropper cannot decode any block, whereas it consumes vast transmission power in order to minimize the eavesdropper's interception capability. Compared to the benchmark method, better secrecy performance can be achieved by the signal alignment method without the eavesdropper's location information, benefited from the spatial diversity of DAEs and the legitimate user.
B. Sensitivity Analysis
To evaluate the performance sensitivity of the signal alignment method with the eavesdropper's location information to the user's and the eavesdropper's location inaccuracy, we assume that the user's and the eavesdropper's location errors both are independently and identically distributed in longitude and Fig. 6 , which reveals that as σ d increases, the BLER performance gap between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper degrades. However, with a fairly large location error level σ d = 100 m, only slight performance degradation is observed, which indicates the robustness of the proposed method to the location inaccuracy.
C. Secrecy Capacity and Secure DOF
For a narrowband system at frequency 13 kHz, Fig. 7(a) shows the secrecy capacity of the benchmark method and the signal alignment method with the eavesdropper's location information, as well as the legitimate user link capacity in the benchmark method. In the signal alignment method, the active DAE set and the transmission power of each active DAE are obtained in (42a) through maximizing the lower bound of the secrecy capacity. As the transmission SNR increases, one can observe that (1) the secrecy capacity of the benchmark method converges, and is further less than the secrecy capacity lower bound of the signal alignment method; and (2) the secrecy capacity upper bound of the signal alignment method increases almost at the same rate as that of the user link capacity in the benchmark method. Fig. 7(b) shows the lower bound of the secure d.o.f. of the signal alignment method with different total numbers of randomly distributed DAEs. The result reveals that the average lower bound of the secure d.o.f. increases monotonically with the total number of DAEs, which agrees with intuition, as more DAEs promise more freedom to enlarge the received signal quality difference between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper.
D. A Case Study
Some insights about the proposed signal alignment method can be revealed in a case study. Specifically, we consider 4 DAEs uniformly distributed in a ring area defined by a circle of radius Two types of transmissions are considered: (i) the unicast transmission, where the DAEs transmit to each legitimate user individually based on the proposed signal alignment method; and (ii) the broadcast transmission, where the proposed signal alignment method is applied only with respect to user 1 and the eavesdropper. The minimal received SNR at each individual user in the unicast transmission and at user 1 in the broadcast transmission is constrained to be Γ = 7 dB. 400 system layouts are tested. The performance of different transmission strategies is presented in Fig. 9 . The following observations can be obtained based on Fig. 9 (a) about the unicast transmission. Firstly, the proposed signal alignment method provides decent transmission secrecy for users 2 and 3, and none of the blocks can be decoded at the eavesdropper. Secondly, when the distance between the eavesdropper and user 1 is large, the secrecy performance of user 1 is similar to that of users 2 and 3. The performance gap between the eavesdropper and user 1 decreases as the eavesdropper moves closer to user 1. When the eavesdropper and user 1 are at the same location, the decoding performances of the two are identical.
About the broadcast transmission, Fig. 9(b) shows that when the distance between the eavesdropper and user 1 is large, user 1 achieves better decoding performance than users 2 and 3, since signals from active DAEs could collide at the latter two users. In addition, users 2 and 3 exhibit similar decoding performance due to their symmetric location with respect to the eavesdropper.
VII. EMULATED EXPERIMENT RESULTS
We use the data set collected from a field experiment to emulate OFDM transmissions from coordinated DAEs. The mobile acoustic communication experiment (MACE10) was carried out off the coast of Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, in June 2010. The water depth was about 95 to 100 meters. The receiver array was stationary, while the source was towed slowly away from the receiver from 500 m to 4.5 km and then towed back, at a speed around 1 m/s. Out of two tows in the experiment, we only consider the data set collected in the first tow, where 30 recorded transmissions are used for emulation and each transmission has 20 OFDM blocks. The average received SNR of the recorded transmissions is around 20 dB.
The ZP-OFDM parameters are listed in Table II . The subcarrier distribution is identical to that in Section VI. The data symbols are encoded with a rate-1/2 nonbinary LDPC code and 
We recycle the simulated system layouts in Section VI, and assume that the maximal transmission power level of each DAE is 180 dB and the noise level is 60 dB. The received signals at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper are emulated based on the recorded waveforms in MACE10, where prior to the emulation, a resampling operation to remove the Doppler effect caused by the source mobility. Fig. 10 illustrates an example of the evolution of the underwater acoustic channel in MACE10. For each simulation layout, white Gaussian noise of appropriate variance levels are introduced to control the received SNR at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper.
With different numbers of receive hydrophones, Fig. 11 shows the BLER performance of the eavesdropper and the legitimate user in the three configurations defined in Section VI-A. Similar to our observations in simulation, the signal alignment method with the eavesdropper's location information achieves the highest level of transmission secrecy. The signal alignment method without the eavesdropper's location information exhibits better secrecy performance than the benchmark method.
For the signal alignment method with the eavesdropper's location information, the impact of location inaccuracy of both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper on the transmission secrecy is depicted in Fig. 12 , where the location error of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper follows an independent zero-mean Gaussian distribution with a standard deviation of σ d . Similar to the observation in Fig. 6 , the BLER performance gap between the legitimate user and the eavesdropper degrades as the location error increases. Nevertheless, the proposed method achieves decent secrecy performance with a location error less than 50 m, and localization techniques with an error less than 10 m have been demonstrated in real underwater acoustic systems [45] .
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this work, we investigated signal alignment for secure underwater CoMP transmissions. Exploiting the low sound speed in water and the spatial diversity of DAEs, transmission secrecy was achieved by overlapping signals at the eavesdropper while keeping them free of collision at the legitimate user. Practical designs of the above signal alignment concept were pursued. The eavesdropper's interception capability was minimized through jointly optimizing relevant transmission parameters, including the transmit DAE set, and the transmission schedule and power level of each DAE, under a lower bound constraint of the received SNR at the legitimate user. Taking OFDM as the underlying modulation, both simulation and emulated experimental results showed that the proposed method has much higher data confidentiality than a benchmark method. From an informationtheoretic perspective, we further derived the secrecy capacity and the secure d.o.f. of the signal alignment method, which revealed that a secure d.o.f. greater than The optimization problem in (21) can be recast as
Based on the definition of θ ν,μ in (23), the constraint in (49b) becomes
Substituting (10) into (50) yields
With the definition of vector q in (24), the constraint in (49b) can be rewritten as
whereG 1 (ξ, ) is a generic matrix of size M × M . The constraint (49c) can be rewritten as
where the size of G 2 is (M − 1) × M . Define q L and q U through replacing P tx,μ by P tx,μ,L and P tx,μ,th in (24) , respectively. The optimization problem in (49) can be reformulated into the matrix form in (25) .
APPENDIX B EXTENSION TO GENERAL SCENARIOS
In the scenario with multiple users, the constraints (21b) and (21c) can be modified to ensure that the blocks arrived at each user are well separated and with sufficiently large received SNRs. Denote T user as the user set with N user users. The optimization problem can be formulated as 
ξ μ + 1 ,ν − ξ μ ,ν ≥ T bl , ∀ν ∈ T user (54c) 0 ≤ P tx,μ ≤ P th , ∀μ ∈ T DAE (54d)
where λ μν and ξ μ,ν is the received SNR and the time-of-arrival of the signal from the μth DAE at the νth legitimate user, respectively. The optimization problem (54) can be solved by the proposed Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 for synchronous and asynchronous signal alignment, respectively. Furthermore, from the legitimate user's perspective, the scenario with multiple eavesdroppers is equivalent to the scenario where an eavesdropper has multiple geographically distributed antennas. Modification of the objective function (21a) to the scenario where an eavesdropper has multiple distributed antennas depends on the diversity combining technique used by the eavesdropper. For instance, when the maximal ratio combining (MRC) is used by an eavesdropper equipped with N ant distributed antennas, the optimization problem can be recast as 
0 ≤ P tx,μ ≤ P th , ∀μ ∈ T DAE (55d)
where λ (e) μν is the received SINR of the signal from the μth DAE at the νth antenna of the eavesdropper. By introducing an auxiliary variable := max μ∈T D A E N a n t ν =1 λ (e) μν (56) and a new constraint N a n t ν =1 λ (e) μν ≤ , the optimization problem (55) can be solved based on Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 for synchronous and asynchronous signal alignment, respectively.
It can be easily shown that the scenario with multiple legitimate users and the scenario where an eavesdropper has multiple distributed antenna elements can be jointly considered through combining the optimization problems (54) and (55) .
APPENDIX C DERIVATION OF SECURE DEGREES OF FREEDOM
Assume the transmission powers of active DAEs going to infinity in the same order. Accordingly, the received signal power at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper can be rewritten as P rx,μ = α μ P and P 
Due to the inter-symbol-interference the denominator of the second term is bounded as P → +∞, hence leading the second term to be zero. Applying the L'Hospital's Rule to the first term yields 
For the first term, from (58) , it goes to 1 as P → +∞. 
Consider that T o M −1 = T max . The secrecy d.o.f. is therefore lower bounded by
